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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Cross-Appellant/
Petitioner,

Case No. 20040360-SC

v.
HANK GALETKA, Utah State
Prison Warden,
Cross-Appellee/
Respondent.

CROSS-APPELLEE GALETKA'S BRIEF
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Menzies cross-appeals the district court's order
requiring appellant Division of Finance to pay for his appellate
costs.

The district court entered the order in a proceeding

under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside a judgment denying Mr.
Menzies post-conviction relief from his capital murder conviction
and death sentence.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (West 2004).1
x

Mr. Menzies asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
the Division of Finance's appeal because the order at issue is
not a final appealable order. Cross-Appellant's Brief at 1-3.
The Division of Finance has addressed that issue in its reply
brief. Appellant's Reply Brief at 3-8. Of course, if
jurisdiction over the Division's appeal fails, jurisdiction over
the derivative cross-appeal will fail as well.
In partial support of his jurisdictional argument, Mr.
1

ISSUE STATEMENT AND REVIEW STANDARD
Where the Division of Finance has conceded its
responsibility to pay for Mr. Menzies' appellate costs, may Mr.
Menzies obtain a double recovery of those costs by requiring
respondent to pay them as well?
No review standard applies.

The lower court ruled that the

Division of Finance must pay Mr. Menzies' appellate costs.
Consequently, the court did not resolve Mr. Menzies' argument
that the respondent should have to pay those costs if the
Division did not have to pay them.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a12.1 and 78-35a-202 (West's 2004); Utah R. Civ. P. 7; and Utah
Administrative Code R25-14-3 through 5.
CASE STATEMENT
Nearly two decades ago, Mr. Menzies kidnapped Maurine
Hunsaker from her work.

He held her until the following morning,

when he drove her to Storm Mountain, tied her to a tree,
strangled her, and slashed her throat.
Menzies,

889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), cert,

See

generally

denied,

State

v.

513 U.S. 1115

Menzies asserts that there is no final order because the district
court continues to hear matters. As one example, petitioner
cites a State's motion to release evidence for DNA testing.
Cross-Appellant's Brief at 2 n.l. The argument misstates the
record. The State filed the motion in the criminal case,
State
v. Menzies,
case nos. CR86-887 and 031102598. That case is not
on appeal.
2

(1995).

A jury convicted Mr. Menzies of capital murder, and

Judge Raymond Uno sentenced him to death.

Id.

Mr. Menzies began post-conviction proceedings in 1995.
After lengthy litigation, which included Mr. Menzies' failure to
cooperate in discovery and resulting sanctions, the postconviction court, on January 11, 2002, entered judgment in
respondent's favor.

(See generally fact statement in

respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to
Set Aside Judgment, R. 2410-33).
Although Mr. Menzies filed a timely appeal notice in the
post-conviction case and obtained a lengthy extension to file his
post-conviction brief, he never filed a brief.
Mr. Menzies an opportunity to cure the default.

The Court gave
When he did not,

this Court, on December 19, 2002, made final its order dismissing
the post-conviction appeal.

(Id.)

In August 2003, nearly eight months after this Court made
its dismissal of the post-conviction appeal final, Mr. Menzies,
relying on Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), filed a memorandum in support
of relief from the post-conviction judgment against him (R. 232253).

The lower court denied Mr. Menzies relief from the post-

conviction judgment (R. 3701-69).
outcome.

Menzies

v. Galetka,

Mr. Menzies appealed that

case no. 20040289 ("rule 60(b)

3

appeal").2
Mr. Menzies also moved the district court to order "the
government" to pay for his copy of a deposition taken during the
rule 60(b) proceedings, for any transcripts his attorney ordered
for the rule 60(b) appeal, and for his appellate printing costs
(R. 3790-99).

Respondent objected.3

The Division of Finance

("the Division"), the State agency that administers the funds
used to pay for capital post-conviction litigation, appeared and
also objected (R. 3830-35).
Mr. Menzies' and the Division's arguments focused on three
Division administrative rules governing two separate funds for
capital post-conviction litigation.

Utah Administrative Code

R25-14-3(2) provides that counsel appointed in capital postconviction cases "agree to accept as full compensation for the
legal services performed and litigation

costs

incurred

the

amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees

2

The Court has stayed the rule 60(b) appeal while petitioner
supplements the record.
Respondent filed his objection to the request; however, the
district court has not made respondent's objection part of the
record. Respondent has moved to supplement the record with the
motion. To avoid delay, respondent has attached a copy bearing
the district court's file stamp as Addendum B.
Respondent indicated, among other things, the he had already
paid the transcription costs of for most of the rule 60(b)
hearings, including transcripts of the rule 60(b) evidentiary
hearing, the argument on the rule 60(b) motion, and the district
court's oral ruling denying rule 60(b) relief (R. 4134 at 15-16).
4

found in Section R25-14-4."

(Emphasis added.)

The Schedule of

Payments provides for flat amounts payable to counsel upon the
occurrence of certain events.

Utah Administrative Code R25-14-4.

Utah Admin. Rule 25-14-5 provides a separate fund of $20,000
"for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and
consultants."
The Division argued that the controlling rules' plain
language required Mr. Menzies' counsel to pay for transcription
and printing costs out of the flat fees paid to her for legal
services and litigation costs.

Mr. Menzies argued that the

Division should pay for transcription and printing costs out of
the $20,000 reserved for investigators, expert witnesses, and
consultants, leaving the amounts paid for his counsel's services
undiminished by such litigation costs.

(R. 3792-99, 3830-35).

The district court accepted Mr. Menzies' argument and
ordered the Division to pay the transcription and printing costs
out of the $20,000 designated for paying "court approved
investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants" (R. 3907-3909) .
The Division appealed that order (R. 3919-20).

The district

court did not resolve whether respondent had a separate
obligation to pay for Mr. Menzies' appellate costs.
Mr. Menzies timely filed his cross-appeal against
respondent.

According to Mr. Menzies, he filed the cross-appeal

only to preserve the argument that respondent should have to pay

5

his appellate costs if the Division is not required to do so.4

4

In his brief, Mr. Menzies purports to seek alternative
relief from the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. CrossAppellant's Brief at 24-29. It does not appear that Mr. Menzies
made the District Attorney's Office a party either below or on
appeal.
Mr. Menzies mailed a copy of the motion at issue to a deputy
Salt Lake district attorney (R. 3828). However, the Salt Lake
District Attorney has filed two non-party letters asserting that
this was insufficient service to make the District Attorney a
party to the rule 60(b) litigation below. Addendum C.
Mr. Menzies' cross-appeal notice named only respondent as
cross-appellee, and he served it only on respondent (R. 3917-18).
Mr. Menzies subsequently filed an "amended" cross-appeal notice,
purportedly adding the "original prosecuting entity" as a crossappellee (R. 3948-49). However, Mr. Menzies filed that notice
thirty-four days after the district court entered the order from
which Mr. Menzies' cross-appeals (R. 3904-3909) and twenty-one
days after the Division filed its appeal notice (R. 3919). The
cross-appeal against the "original prosecuting entity" is
untimely. Utah R. App. P. 4(c).
6

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE DIVISION HAS CONCEDED THAT IT MUST PAY FOR
MR. MENZIES' APPELLATE COSTS, MR. MENZIES CANNOT OBTAIN
A DOUBLE RECOVER BY REQUIRING RESPONDENT TO PAY FOR
THOSE COSTS AS WELL5
In his cross-appeal, Mr. Menzies argues that, if the

5

Mr. Menzies relies on a variety of rule and constitutional
arguments. Respondent does not agree that his cited authority
establishes a separate obligation for respondent to pay Mr.
Menzies' appellate costs. However, respondent has not addressed
those arguments here because the Division has conceded its
obligation to pay the costs. Any issue about a separate
obligation of respondent is irrelevant.
Respondent notes that Mr. Menzies did not preserve the rule
arguments on which he relies. Mr. Menzies relies on Utah R. Civ.
P. 65C as a basis for ordering respondent to pay those costs.
Although Mr. Menzies cited that rule in the district court,
respondent pointed out that, by its own terms, the rule did not
apply (R. 4134 at 22). For the first time on appeal, Mr. Menzies
offers a reason why the Court should apply rule 65C despite its
plain language that it does not apply. Mr. Menzies identifies no
basis for this Court to consider his unpreserved argument;
therefore, the Court should disregard it. State
v. Pinder,
case
no. 20030484, 2005 UT 15 147 (declining to address an unpreserved
argument because Pinder did not argue plain error).
Similarly, Mr. Menzies did not preserve most of the
constitutional arguments he presses on appeal. In his opening
memorandum in the proceedings below, Mr. Menzies relied only on
open-courts cases; respondent addressed only that argument in his
opposition. Mr. Menzies did not raise his additional
constitutional arguments until he filed his reply memorandum. (R.
3791-99, 3836-50). Mr. Menzies' constitutional arguments,
presented for the-first time in his reply, were untimely. Utah
R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) (reply memoranda must be limited to addressing
new material in opposition memoranda). Cf. State
v. Kruger,
6
P.3d 1116, 2000 UT 60 5120-21 (striking an argument first raised
in an appellate reply brief because it did not address a new
matter raised by the State). Consequently, those arguments are
not preserved for appeal. See, e.g., State
v. Pinder,
case no.
20030484, 2005 UT 15 145 (stating general rule that a party must
timely object in order to preserve an issue for appellate
review).
7

Division does not have to pay his appellate costs, the Court
should order respondent Galetka to pay those costs.
Appellant's Brief at 24-29.

Cross-

However, the Division and Mr.

Menzies agree that the Division must pay Mr. Menzies' appellate
costs.

The Division only disputes out of which fund it must pay

those costs.

Because no claim that the Division raises on appeal

would relieve the Division of its obligation to pay Mr. Menzies'
appellate costs, Mr. Menzies has no claim against respondent as
an alternative source of funds for his appellate costs.6
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004) provides for paid
counsel to represent indigent persons sentenced to death who wish
to challenge their capital murder convictions or death sentences.
The statute charges the Division with administering the funds to
pay the "costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation
expenses."

The statute further requires the Division to

establish administrative rules governing the funds.

Utah Code

Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c) (West 2004).
The Division's rules create two funds: 1) an attorney fees

Respondent moved in the rule 60(b) appeal to strike Mr.
Menzies' record designation that included transcripts of
previously untranscribed hearings from the underlying postconviction case. The Court deferred ruling on which of those
transcripts it would allow to remain in the rule 60(b) appellate
record. Addendum D. Nothing in this brief should be construed
as waiving respondent's arguments in support of striking those
transcripts from the record. Respondent will renew the motion to
strike in conjunction with filing his brief in the rule 60(b)
appeal.
8

and litigation costs fund ("fees and costs fund"), Utah
Administrative Code R25-14-3 and 4; and 2) an expert witness,
consultant, and investigator fund ("expert witness fund"), Utah
Administrative Code R35-14-5.

The fees and costs fund requires

the Division to pay flat amounts upon the occurrence of specified
objective events throughout a capital post-conviction proceeding,
including an appeal.

It also permits payment of additional funds

at the rate of $100 per hour up to a maximum of $5,000, for
"extraordinary services." Utah Administrative Code R25-14-4.
The Division's rules's plain language requires all capital postconviction counsel to accept these amounts "as full compensation
for the legal services performed and litigation

costs

incurred."

Utah Administrative Code R25-14-3 (emphasis added).7
The expert witness fund provides a maximum of $20,000 for
expert witnesses, consultants, and investigators.

The amounts

actually paid up to the $20,000 maximum turns on the postconviction court's approval.

Utah Administrative Code R25-14-5.

The lower court ruled that the Division had to pay Mr.
Menzies' appellate costs out of the expert witness fund. On

7

Mr. Menzies' counsel asserts that she has received $10,000
thus far. She asserts that she has moved to obtain the
additional $5,000 available for "extraordinary services." When
she files Mr. Menzies' brief in case no. 20040289, she will
receive an additional $5,000. When the Court issues the
remittitur, she will receive another $2,500. Thus, Mr. Menzies'
counsel will receive $17,500 and may receive up to $22,500 for
representing petitioner on the rule 60(b) proceedings.
9

appeal, the Division argues only that it has paid the appellate
costs and will continue to pay those costs by paying Mr. Menzies'
counsel from the fees and costs fund.

The Division does not

argue that it does not have to pay Mr. Menzies' appellate costs
at all.

See generally, Appellant's Brief and Appellant's Reply

Brief.
If the Division loses the appeal, the district court's order
directing the Division to pay appellate costs from the
investigative funds will stand.

If the Division wins its appeal,

it will be because this Court agrees that the Division has paid
and will continue to pay the appellate costs from the fees and
costs fund.

There is no possible outcome in this appeal where

the Division will avoid paying Mr. Menzies' appellate costs for
transcripts and printing.8
The cross-appeal does not seek alternative payment from
respondent; it seeks a double recovery: one from the Division,

8

As stated in footnote 6, the Court deferred ruling on
respondent's motion to strike in the rule 60(b) appeal. The
Court also ruled, however, that Mr. Menzies' counsel will have to
repay the costs of preparing any transcript that the Court
ultimately strikes from the record. Thus, irrespective of the
outcome in this appeal, Mr. Menzies' counsel may still have to
repay most and maybe all of the transcription costs at issue.
10

and a second from respondent.

Mr. Menzies cites no authority to

support reaching that result.9
DATED March 9, 2005.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

A.

THOMAS7 BRUNKER
ERIN RILEY
Assistant Attorneys General

9

Of course, if the Division wins the appeal, it will reduce
the amount Mr. Menzies' counsel will receive for her time. Mr.
Menzies cannot rely on that outcome to impose on respondent a
second recovery for Mr. Menzies' litigation expenses. If Mr.
Menzies' counsel believes that the flat fees paid out of the fee
and costs fund insufficiently compensates her for her time and
litigation costs, she must challenge the administrative rule
itself. She has not done so.
Moreover, Mr. Menzies' counsel cannot challenge the rule on
this appeal. To challenge an administrative rule, Mr. Menzies'
counsel must exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking
judicial relief. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (West's 2004).
She may bypass the administrative remedies only under limited
circumstances. Id. Mr. Menzies' counsel has not exhausted her
administrative remedies or argued that the circumstances of the
case excuse her failure to do so.
11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that, on March 9, 2005, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing CROSS-APPELLEE'S BRIEF was mailed by first-class
mail, postage pre-paid, to Mr. Menzies' counsel, EIZABETH HUNT
L.L.C., ELIZABETH HUNT, at 569 Browning Ave., Salt Lake City,
Utah 84105; and was hand-delivered to Division of Finance's
counsel, Assistant Attorney General Joel Ferre, at 160 East 300
South, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857.
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Addenda

Addendum A

(i;W Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of the rule
by filing a complaint with the county clerk in the district court where the
person resides or in the district court in Salt Lake County.
(b) Any person aggrieved by an agency's failure to comply with Section
63_46a-3 may obtain judicial review of the agency's failure to comply by
filing a complaint with the clerk of the district court where the person resides
or in the district court in Salt Lake County.
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a person seeking judicial
review under this section shall exhaust that person's administrative remedies by
complying with the requirements of Section 63-46a-12 before filing the complaint
(b) When seeking judicial review of a rule, the person need not exhaust
that person's administrative remedies if:
(i) less than six months has passed since the date that the rule became
effective and the person had submitted verbal or written comments on the
rule to the agency during the public comment period;
(ii) a statute granting rulemaking authority expressly exempts rules
made under authority of that statute from compliance with Section
63~46a-12; or
(iii) compliance with Section 63-46a-12 would cause the person irreparable harm.
(3)(a) In addition to the information required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complaint filed under this section shall contain:
(i) the name and mailing address of the plaintiff;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the defendant agency;
(iii) the name and mailing address of any other party joined in the action
as a defendant;
(iv) the text of the rule or proposed rule, if any;
(v) an allegation that the person filing the complaint has either exhausted the administrative remedies by complying with Section 63-46a-12 or
met the requirements for waiver of exhaustion of administrative remedies
established by Subsection (2)(b);
(vi) the relief sought; and
(vii) factual and legal allegations supporting the relief sought.
(b)(i) The plaintiff shall serve a summons and a copy of the complaint as
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(ii) The defendants shall file a responsive pleading as required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedures.
(iii) The agency shall file the administrative record of the rule, if any,
with its responsive pleading.
(4) The district court may grant relief to the petitioner by:
(a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds that:
(i) the rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not
have legal authority to make the rule;
(ii) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole administrative record; or
(iii) the agency did not follow proper rulemaking procedure;
(b) declaring the rule nonapplicable to the petitioner;
(c) remanding the matter to the agency for compliance with proper rulemaking procedures or further fact-finding;
(d) ordering the agency to comply with Section 63-46a-3;
(e) issuing a judicial stay or injunction to enjoin the agency from illegal
action or action that would cause irreparable harm to the petitioner; or
(f) any combination of Subsections (4)(a) through (e).
(5) If the plaintiff meets the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), the district
court may review and act on a complaint under this section whether or not the
•nlaintiff ha<; r^nnpQtprl thf* acr^n^r ravimir 1-,-^A^^ o~~».:— £•*> *?

* *»

gf */0-ODa-v£i«* Appointments ana payment, ot counsej nx deatii penalty
cases
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and
sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall be advised itf open coui^ on the
recori i n ^ hearing scheduled no les4s than 30 days prior to the signing of the
death warrant, Q£ ^the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges J o the
conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants.
(2)(aX If -a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court^shall
determine whether the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record
regarding the defendant's indigency* if the court finds that the defendant is
indigent,, it rshall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent
defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah' Rules of
Criminal Procedure:
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the oifer of counsel shall be advised
on the record by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the
court may accept the rejection.
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in
providing the representation provided for in this section shall be paid from
stake hinds by the Division of Finance according to rufes established1 pursuant
ib Title 63, chapter 46a, UtaH Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Laws 1997* c. 76 §" 2, eff, Maj 5, 199/,

(a) Pleadings., There shall be a- complaint; and *an answer;? a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to^ a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim^ &
third-party complaint, if a person who was not anr original party is summoned undec
the provisions of Rule 14; and^ a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is*
served. * No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply
to an answer or a third-party answer.
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall Be by motion which,
unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner,*
shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state*
succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief
soughti
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum.
Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party
opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in oppositionr Within five days after
service of the ^memorandum in opposition, the moving party may file a reply
memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memoran-/
dum in opposition. No other memoranda' will be considered without leave of court/
A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without
leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without
leave of the court* The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good cause.*
(c)(3) Content
(ck3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgmpnt (shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials,*1 such as affidavits or discovery materials.
Each fact set forth in the moving parly's memorandum is deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by "the responding party!"
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain
a verbatim^ restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted/and
may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the,
moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an
explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set
forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and
numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a
table of contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of
documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request, the
motion will not be submitted for decision.
<e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for
decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption of the
document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a
motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or
defense in the action unless the court finds that +hp m^imi ™ ^ ^ r ^ v * i

(f)(1) An. order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order
entered in writing, not included in a judgment: An order for the payment of money
may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise
provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be
vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shaft
state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's
initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial'
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall,
within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties, a
proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed
order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order
shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration
of the time to object.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. , A recommendation
of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner
as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made hj open court
or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, ten days after the
minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may respond to the
objection in the same manner as responding to a motion.
[Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004]

R25-14-3. Scope of Services.
(1) All appointed counsel, by accepting the court appointment
to represent an indigent
client sentenced- to death and by
presenting a Request for Payment to the Division of Finance,
agree to provide all reasonable and necessary post- conviction
legal services for the client, including timely filing an action
under the provisions. of Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction
Remedies Act and representing the client in all legal proceedings
conducted thereafter including, i f requested by the client, an
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
(2) All appointed counsel agree to accept as full compensation
for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred
the amounts provided -in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys
Fees found in Section R25-14-4

R 2 5 -1 4 - 4 . S c h e d u 1 e o f P a ym e n t s c f A 1 1 o r i I e ^ s i " e e s .
All counsel appointed to jointly represent a single client
shall be paid, in the aggregate, according to the following
schedule of payments upon certification to the Division of
Finance that the specified legal service was performed or the
specified events have occurred:
(1) $5,000.00 upon appointment by the district court and
presentation of a signed Request for Payment to the Division of
Finance.
(2) $5,000.00 upon timely filing a petition for post-conviction
relief.
(3) $10,000,00 after all discovery has
prehearing motions have been ruled upon,
evidentiary hearing has been set; .
(4) If an evidentiary hearing
date the first witness is sworn.

been completed, all
an J ,j ;!ate f >i an

is required,

$5,000.00

on

the

(5) $7,500.00 if an appeal is filed from a final order of the
district court. $5,000.00 of the total shall be paid when the
brief on behalf of the indigent person is filed and $2,500.00
when the Utah Supreme Court finally rem: ts the case to the
district court.

[0) an aaainonai ree or i?iuu per nour, but in no event to
exceed $5,000.00 in the aggregate, shall be paid if:
(a) counsel satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code
of Judicial Administration; and
(b) the district court finds:
(i) that the appointed counsel provided extraordinary legal
services that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of
accepting the appointment, such as responding to or filing a
petition for interlocutory appeal, and
(ii) the services were both reasonable and necessary for the
presentation of the client f s claims.
(c) These additional fees shall be paid upon approval by the
district court and compliance with the provisions of this rule.
R25-14-5. Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses.
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation
expenses not to exceed a total of $20,000.00 in any one case for
court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants.
Before payment is made for litigation expenses, the appointed
counsel must submit a request for payment to the Division of
Finance including:
(1) a detailed invoice of all expenses for which payment is
requested; and
(2) written approval of the district court certifying that the
expenses were both reasonable and necessary for the presentation
of the client ! s claims.

Aaaendum B

Thomas B . Brunker, #4 804
Erin Riley, #8375
A s s i s t a n t Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, #4 666
Utah A t t o r n e y General
Heber W e l l s Bldg.
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854"
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone': (801) 366-0180
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Respondent's counsel
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,'
Petitioner,
:
v.
:
HANK GALETKA, Utah State
Prison Warden,

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
REQUIRE GOVERNMENT TO
PAY FOR TRANSCRIPTS,
PRINTING AND COSTS FOR
APPEAL
- Judge P.-i 1 '•'.. Brian

Respondent.
Case N o . CG0106629

R e s p o n d e n t, 1:ftr o u g 1 i c o u i 1 s e ] , s u b in i t s 11 I e f :> 11 o w i n g r e s p o n s e
to petitioner'' s motion to order "the g o v e r n m e n t " to p a y f o r
t r a n s c r i p t s and his costs * n vp-i"l, iir'lulhjj printing.
It' appears that petitioner directs m o s t of t h e a r g u m e n t to
the D i v i s i o n of Finance, n o t respondent
p e t i t i o n e r asks t h e Court to order respondent to p a y for t h e

transcripts and "costs of appeal," including printing costs,
respondent responds as follows:
1.

Petitioner should first seek reimbursement from the

Division of Finance for all "costs of appeal."
2.

If the Division of Finance refuses to pay for

transcripts of any hearing the Court held in these Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b) proceedings, beginning August 12, 2003, respondent will
pay for the transcription if petitioner can establish the
relevance of the particular, untranscribed hearing.1
3.

Petitioner has indicated that he is "inclined to obtain

all transcripts," identifying transcripts dating back to March 6,
1996.

See addendum A.

Respondent objects to ordering the

transcription of hearings that pre-date the rule 60(b)
proceedings.

At this stage, petitioner only has the right to

appeal the denial of rule 60(b) relief.

Any hearings that

petitioner failed to have transcribed and included in the record
for the Court to consider in the rule 60(b) proceedings are
irrelevant for appellate purposes.

In addition, respondent

objects to paying for transcripts of rule 60(b) hearings without
petitioner first demonstrating that they are relevant to claims
he wishes to pursue on appeal.

Respondent has already paid for transcripts of several
hearings.
2

I

Petitioner also asks the Court to order "the g o v e r n m e n t "

I' j* </ fv»r transcripts iiom tl is c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g that have
b e e n lost.

Respondent o b j e c t s to the request.

did not lose Mi" I. J. riiio- o i pts and

"The a o v e r n m e n t "

should nut have to L i a r t h e

burden of reproducing them.
!»

R e s p o n d e ri t o b j e z t s t • :: a i 1 y o r d e r i • :B q u i r i n g h i m t o p a y for

printing costs.

None of the cases p e t i t i o n e r cites o b l i g a t e s the

State • to p a y the appxl i <•»•» p- " i * «iq
conviction petitioners.
indigent p a r t i e s .

*• ' L

M

JLyeiiL p o s t -

Indeed, none of the cases involved

B e c a u s e p e t i t i o n e r cit- * n ) -njthoi'il y

demonstrating that he has a right to p r i n t i n g at State expense,
the Court should deny the request.
SUBMITTKLi March

I' , m I .
MARK S H U R T L E F F
Utah A t t o r n e y General

x

LT^A^^S^

Thomas Brunker
Erin Riley
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y s General
R e s p o n d e n t ' s counsel

3

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I certify that, on March 17, 2004, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing RESPONSE TO MOTION TO REQUIRE GOVERNMENT TO PAY
FOR TRANSCRIPTS, PRINTING AND COSTS FOR APPEAL was mailed by
first class mail, postage pre-paid, to petitioner's counsel,
ELIZABETH HUNT, at P.O. Box 9419, Salt Lake City, Utah 841090419, and was hand-delivered to Division of Finance's counsel,
JOEL FERRE, at 160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114

4

ADDENDUM A

From:
To:
Date:
Subject:

"Liz Hunt" <elizabeth.hunt@comcast.net>
"Tom Brunker" <TBRUNKER@utah gov>
3/8/04 9 50AM
Menzies transcripts

Hi Tom. I am inclined to obtain all transcripts.
In the civil case, this would include the following:
3/6/96 (transcribed)
7/16/96 (transcribed)
9/16/96 (transcribed)
1/29/97
2/24/97
11/3/97
1/29/98
2/13/98
3/13/98
7/15/98
7/22/98
8/21/03 (transcribed)
9/2/03
9/9/03
9/22/03 (transcribed)
11/6/03
1/7/04
1/15/04
1/16/04
2/26/04.
At this point, I do not know which of the criminal transcripts are missing, or whether you have copies that
can be duplicated to go into the record, or if laws require us to have them transcribed again. I also don't
know how to distinguish between the two versions of the transcript, to ascertain what is in the record and
what is missing, but have asked Joan Watt to help me figure that out. What are your thoughts on this?

Addendum C

v^uu

rl Hendrickson
sion Administrator

Bartholomew, Clerk
h Supreme Court
»South State Street
i. Box 140210
t Lake City, Utah 84114-0210
Re: R alph LxroyMeiizi.es v. Hank Guletka, Nc >. 20040360 SC
ir Ms. Bartholomew:
) office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney recently learned of the pendency of this appeal via receipt
. courtesy copy (we assume) of "Responsive Brief of Appellee and Opening Brief of Cross Appellant", filed
Elizabeth Hunt, Counsel for Mr. Menzies.
aid brief at pages 24-29, Mr. Menzies seeks in the alternative that: "The District Attorney's Office or
pondent should be required to provide the transcripts".
: District Attorney's Office does not believe it is a party to the case. We have not received any notice other
i the above referenced brief. We did not appear as a party in the trial court before Judge Brian and are not
ject to that courts jurisdiction.
) District Attorney was not served with Mr. Menzies May 3, 2004, Notice of Cross-Appeal in case No.
106629 or on his January 3, 2005, Amended Request for Transcripts and Designation of Record (copies
ched).
J District Attorney does not waive proper service of process in this proceeding and will not appear as a party
the first time on appeal. Accordingly, we will not be filing any brief or memorandum in this case.
Very truly yours,

Brent H. Cameron
Deputy District Attorney
Civil Division
Elizabeth Hunt
Assistant Attorney Generals, Tomas Brunker, Erin R iley, J oel Ferre
D eputy District Attorney Kent Morgan

DISTRICT ATTORNE^-®W F GfTfS"
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SALT LHKE COUNTY

DAVID E.YOCOM
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CIVIL DIVISION

*J
'

February 24, 2005

Mary Ellen Sloan
Assistant Division Administrator

Karl Hendrickson
Division Administrator

Elizabeth Hunt
569 Browning Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Re:

Menzies Vs. Guletka

Dear Ms. Hunt:
I received a copy of your letter to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court. I am sorry you did not receive the
attachments to my letter. I am enclosing them for your information.
hi addition, after I sent my letter, Tom Brunker faxed us a copy of your Amended Notice of Cross Appeal
on which your mailing certificate indicated Kent Morgan was sent a copy. Kent informs me he does not
remember receiving it.
I am still not convinced that receipt of copies of some pleadings makes the County (DA) a party. The fact
that we prosecuted the criminal case doesn't mean we are a party to a civil case involving Mr. Menzies
and Mr. Guletka. Actions against the County (DA) begin by service of process upon the County Clerk
with a corresponding return of service. I am unaware that this has occurred.
I have discussed this matter with Ms. Pat Bartholomew, Clerk of the Supreme Court, and she also is
confused as to whether the County (DA) is a party, but stated she would bring up the matter with the
Court and get back to me with any request they have.
Absent the Court requesting it, we again decline to file a brief or memorandum in this case.
Very truly yours,

Brent H. Cameron
Deputy District Attorney
Civil Division

pc: Pat Bartholomew, Clerk, Utah Supreme Cpurt
Assistant Attorney Generals, Thomas feunker, Erin Riley, Joel Ferre
Deputy District Attorney's, Kent Morgan, John Soltis
2001 South State Street, S3600

Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84190-1210
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Addendum D
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t^Ci^tiFILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

I UN 3 0 2004 i

JUN 3 0 2Q0k
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
Ralph Leroy Menzies,
Appellant,
Case No. 20040289-SC

v.
Hank Galetka, Utah State
Prison Warden,
Appellee.

ORDER
Before the Court is Appellee's motion to strike Appellant's
designation of record. The motion is denied in part and granted
in part. The State shall be required to provide a transcript for
each hearing described by affidavit to be submitted by
Appellant's counsel to the district court. The affidavit shall
specify the manner in which each hearing was referenced during
the rule 60(b) proceedings and its relevance to those
proceedings. For purposes of plenary review of the denial of the
rule 60 (b) motion, this court will only consider those record
materials properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion
proceedings. In the event this Court finds that a transcript was
not referenced during the rule 60(b) proceedings, but Appellant's
counsel nevertheless required its production pursuant to
affidavit, Appellant shall be required to reimburse the State for
the costs of procuring the transcript. Appellant's motion for
costs and attorney fees is denied.
FOR THE COURT:

L-^o-o
Date

latthew B. Durrant
Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on June 30, 2004, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
ELIZABETH HUNT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1018 E MILLBERT AVE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106
ERIN RILEY
THOMAS BRUNKER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY
ATTN: KAREN EELLS
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119
Dated this June 30, 2004.

asr^-JT
y Clerk

JU^>

}JXJL^/(X^\

Case No. 20040289
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY, 030106629

